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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
difficulty in interpreting the amendments for those who conscien-
tously wish to comply with the amended election laws.
The best feature of this Act appears to be the provision which
requires the county clerks to certify to the Secretary of State that
they have complied with the section requiring purging from the
rolls the names of those voters who died between 1964 and 1968."
The intent and purpose behind the enactment of these amendments
could be furthered if the Secretary of State would promulgate a re-
gulation (as he has the statutory power to do) that the county
clerks certify to him that they have complied with all the duties
imposed on them under the West Virginia Election Code each
time such a duty arises.
This Act strives to achieve a faster, more effective purge of the
registration rolls. Continuous purging of the rolls appears to be a
desirable goal. 2 The latent function of the bill seems to be to
reduce the opportunities for election frauds by limiting the registra-
tion rolls to live, active, qualified voters. Whether the opportunities
for election frauds will be diminished by this bill depends on con-
scientious compliance with the statutes by the clerk of each county
court and vigorous enforcement of the election laws by the Secre-




Accidents on the high speed highways of today are taking a
prohibitive toll of the driving population. In 1966, there were
52,500 deaths and 1,900,000 disabling injuries resulting from
motor vehicle accidents, an increase of over 7 per cent compared
with 1965.' It has been stated that "more than twice the number
of American deaths have been due to automobile accidents during
the twentieth century than were due to all the wars since the
Declaration of Independence."2 Studies show that from 50 per cent
to 70 per cent of all fatal accidents involve a driver who has been
" W. VA. CODE ch. 3, art. 2, § 22 (Michie 1966).
12 See 22 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 320 (1965).
TRAt'iic S.Au= MAucH 1967 EDrON 9, National Safety Council.
2 MAGEE AN Brcxm.HAuPT, GENRIAL INSUrANCE 442 (7th ed. 1964).
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drinking.' It is quite evident that the problem of the drinking driver
is serious enough to draw close attention from all of us. The legisla-
tures of many of the states have been forced to pass more stringent
laws to cope with the problem and to present a stronger deterrent
to those who wish to mix gasoline and alcohol.
Early state statutes dealing with the problem of driving while
drinking required the prosecutor to prove that the defendant was
drunk or intoxicated.4 Under these circumstances, it was necessary
to produce a witness who would testify that the driver was unable
to stand or was unable to walk a straight line.5 As the number of
automobiles on the road increased and the number of serious acci-
dents increased correspondingly states were forced to enact more
severe laws relating to drinking and driving. We have now reached
the point where all but three states follow the language set forth
in the Uniform Vehicle Code6 making it an offense to drive a
motor vehicle while "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."'
Under the new phrase, "under the influence of intoxicating
liquor" it is not necessary to prove the defendant was so intoxicated
that he could not drive safely: "all that the statute requires is that
the appellant be under the influence while operating a motor ve-
hicle."8
Since there are over 60 pathological conditions which produce
symptoms similar to intoxication,9 and since the new statutes re-
quire a lesser degree of intoxication for a conviction, many states
have adopted voluntary chemical tests which show scientifically
the degree of intoxication of the defendant instead of relying upon
testimony of witness for this determination."0 "The blood test does
as much to protect an innocent driver as it does to aid the state in
the prosecution of a guilty one,"" since those who have the symp-
toms but who have not been drinking will be protected from
justifiable reaction of witnesses. It has been said, "In the absence
3 TRAyFc SA TY, FEB. 1967 EDITIoN 8, National Safety Council.
" R. DoNIGAN, CIEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 1966) [Herein-
after cited as DoNiAcq.]
5 Id.
6 UNIORM VEMCLr_ CODE § 11-902(A) (1962).
7 DoNIGAN at 4.
8 Commonwealth v. Buoy, 128 Pa. Super. 264, 193 A. 144, 145 (1937).
9 Smith, Implied Consent Legislation and the Virginia Experience, 38
U. VA. NEws L Err= 37 (1962) [Hereinafter cited as Smith].
10 DONIGAN at 10.
1, Marbut v. Comm'n, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982 (1965).
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of chemical tests even a competent physician cannot swear with
certainty that the individual had a drop of alcohol in his body.'" 2
Since the early statutes relating to chemical tests were voluntary,
they did not prove too successful because many defendants refused
to submit to them, thereby depriving the courts of the reliable evid-
ence they afford." To make the chemical test statutes more useful,
New York in 1953 passed the first implied consent law in the
United States." Under the implied consent law as a condition to
driving upon the highways of a state, a driver is deemed to have
impliedly consented to having a chemical test of his blood, breath
or urine if charged with driving while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor.'5 The implied consent law has been likened to a
bilateral contract whereby the state offers the privilege to drive
upon its highways in return for the motorist's agreement to submit
to the test. It is said that the driver accepts the offer when he
drives on the highways.' 6
Under the implied consent law as adopted by the National Com-
mittee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances in their Uniform
Vehicle Code,'" the driver may refuse to take the test tendered by
the arresting officer, but for such refusal his license or privilege
to operate a motor vehicle in that state will be revoked. The
driver may contest this action generally by showing that the officer
did not have reasonable grounds to request the motorist to submit
to the test. Even if the driver, after refusing to submit to the
test and having his license or privilege to drive revoked, is ac-
quitted of the charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, he will still be unable to drive for the prescribed period for
the basis of the revocation was the refusal to submit to the test
upon reasonable grounds, not his being under the influence.'" Sub-
sequent acquittal of the driving under the influence charge will not
terminate the revocation which is an administrative action not
dependent upon a criminal prosecution.
Earlier chemical test laws provided for a presumption that the
driver was "under the influence" if the alcoholic content in the
12 Smith at 37.
'3 DoNIGAN at 175.
'4 Smith at 38.
15 Moore v. MacDuff, 309 N.Y. 35, 127 N.E.2d 741 (1955).
16 Smith at 38.
'7 UNmoRMu VEHICLE CODE § 6-205.1 (1962).
18 E.g., Marbut v. Comm'n 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982 (1965); State
v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2 276 (1964).
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blood was .15 per cent or higher.'9 Although it is scientifically
accepted that one is impaired at the .10 per cent of alcohol level,2"
the .15 per cent level was originally used to provide ample tolerance
and to help assure passage of the bills.2 ' Modem acts acknowledge
scientific determinations and accept the .10 per cent level as the
presumptive level of being under the influence of alcohol.2
Modem implied consent laws generally provide for the following
tests to determine the percentage of alcohol in the driver's blood:
blood, breath, and urine. 3 Since alcohol stored in the brain causes
intoxication, the best method for determining the degree of intoxica-
tion would be to test the brain, but this is impossible for a living
person. Instead, these other tests (blood, breath, and urine) must
be used. The best bio-chemical test for influence of alcohol is the
concentration of alcohol in the blood. Since the alcoholic content of
the urine and breath directly parallel that of the blood all three
tests should prove equally satisfactory.24
Constitutionality of the blood tests for alcoholic content have
generally been attacked upon three grounds: deprivation of due
process of law," violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, 6 and unreasonable search and seizure.2" In two recent cases,
Breithaupt v. Abram2 8 and Schmerber v. California,29 the Supreme
Court of the United States has upheld the reasonable use of blood
tests to determine the degree of intoxication of defendant drivers.
In the Breithaupt case, the defendant had been convicted of in-
voluntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile accident where-
in the defendant was a driver. At the trial, the results of a blood
test, taken by a doctor at the direction of a patrolman who smelled
liquor on the unconscious defendant's breath, were admitted into
evidence over objection. On habeas corpus the defendant argued
violation of due process in that the conduct of the state officers
offended the "sense of justice" mentioned in Rochin v. California.2
'9 E.g., Alxz. EV. STAT. ANNOT., § 28-692(B) (1965).
20 Committee Report, Symposium on Alcohol and Road Traffic, Indiana
University (Dec. 1958).
21 Smith at 38.
22 E.g., UN'WoRM VEcM.E CODE § 11-902(b) (1962).
23 Id
24 Smith at 37, DoIGcA at 12.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
28 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
29 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
30 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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In the Rochin case, police officers illegally entered the home of the
defendant, forcibly tried to prevent his swallowing two capsules of
morphine, then took him to a hospital where the pills were extracted
by means of a stomach pump. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, delivering
the opinion of the Court stated that these acts on the part of the
police officers were "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and screw. . . ,,3t Rochin's
conviction was reversed because the methods of the police officers
were in violation of due process. But, in the Breithaupt case, the
Court felt defendant was not denied due process because "there
is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood
when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. 32
The Court went on to say that blood tests have become "routine in
our everyday life' 33 and that they "would not be considered offen-
sive even by the most delicate. 34 In the same case, the Court
seemingly gave its approval to the use of implied consent laws by
the states.35 In the latest case involving blood tests,36 where blood
was taken by a physician over the objection of defendant, the court
held there was no denial of due process since this case was very
similar to that of Breithaupt.
Defendant's argument raising his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was rejected in the Breithaupt case mainly because at that time,
under the decision of Twining v. New Jersey,37 the fifth amendment
privilege was not obligatory upon the states. But, in the Schmerber
decision, the court had to face the problem squarely since the case
of Malloy v. Hogan,38 decided after Breithaupt made the fifth
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. In deciding that Schmerber was not denied his privilege against
self-incrimination the court stated:
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in
question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.39
3, Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
32 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
33 Id. at 436.
34 Id.
3I Id.
36 Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
37 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
38 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19 Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
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In reaching this decision the court considered the case of Holt v.
United States ° where Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "The prohibition
of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against him-
self is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material."4 It thus appears the Supreme
Court has determined that extraction of blood to use as evidence
against a defendant driver does not violate his fifth amendment
rights now protected against state action.
In both Breithaupt and Schmerber the defendant contended that
his fourth amendment rights had been violated in that taking blood
from one unconscious or over one's objection would be an un-
reasonable search and seizure, and that any evidence obtained
thereby should be excluded. Since at the time of the Breithaupt
decision the fourth amendment rights were not obligatory upon the
states 42 the Court did not have to decide the question. But, here
again as with self-incrimination between the time of the Breithaupt
decision and the Schmerber decision, the decision of Mapp v Ohio43
was handed down by the Court holding that the exclusionary rule44
relating to federal courts as set out in Weeks v. United States45
was obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the Court was obliged to decide
if the blood tests were in violation of the fourth amendment. In
Schmerber, the Court stated:
We begin with the assumption that once the privilege against
self-incrimination has been found not to bar compelled in-
trusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcoholic
content, the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain
not against all instrusions as such, but against intrusions which
are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner. In other words, the questions we must
decide in this case are whether the police were justified in re-
quiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the
means and procedure employed in taking his blood respect rele-
vant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. 6
40 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
41 Id. at 252.
42 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
43 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44 Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment must be
excluded from federal prosecutions.
45 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
46 Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
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In finding that fourth amendment rights had not been violated,
the Court stated that the reasonableness standard was complied
with in that a competent physician extracted the sample of blood.
The Court also stated that since the defendant was arrested after
the officer smelled liquor on his breath, there was probable cause,
therefore, a valid arrest. Also the Court stated that an officer is
allowed to make a search for evidence of crime incident to a law-
ful arrest, and that in the case of an emergency a search warrant
is not necessary. Considering the fact that the alcoholic level will
decrease with the passage of time, the Court felt the officer was
justified in taking the defendant to a physician to have his blood
extracted before the evidence had diminished.
It is therefore evident that if blood tests are administered in a
reasonable manner, they will be upheld as constitutional. Based
upon the Breithaupt and Schmerber cases which upheld the use of
blood test where properly administered, it would definitely seem
that breath and urine tests, which are much less offensive than
having the body intruded to obtain blood, would be upheld by the
United States Supreme Court so long as these tests are administered
in a reasonable manner.
As can be seen, the Supreme Court has upheld the taking of
blood from an unconscious driver and over the objection of a
conscious driver. In determining the justification of the use of
implied consent laws, they can be likened to the long arm statutes
which state that a non-resident driver impliedly consents to having
an officer of the host state accept service of process for him. The
long arm statutes have also withstood the test of the courts.4"
Implied consent laws have been upheld in state courts as a reason-
able regulation under the police powers of the state. 8 The United
States Supreme Court has likewise shown favor toward the implied
consent laws by saying that, "It might be a fair assumption that
a driver on the highways in obedience to a policy of the State, would
consent to have a blood test made. . . ."' It would therefore seem
that states would wisely adopt an implied consent law to protect
its law abiding citizens from those who persist in abusing their
driving privilege. It would also seem wise to have these laws to
protect those drivers who have had only a small amount of
47 DONIGAN at 177.
48 E.g., Lee v. Comm'n, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961).
4" Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
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alcohol" and who are not under the influence, although they might
be convicted if testimony of witnesses was relied upon.
The West Virginia Legislature on February 8, 1968, adopted an
implied consent law to be known as Article 5A of Chapter 17c of
the Code of West Virginia. In adopting this new law, the Legisla-
ture discarded the old voluntary chemical test law." Since many
practitioners in this state may be unfamiliar with an implied consent
statute, it would seem appropriate to give a brief sketch of how the
new law should operate in contrast to the old voluntary one.
At the outset it should be noted that a drinking driver will not
be required to take a blood test, but may instead take a breath
test or a urine test as designated by the arresting officer.5" It
should also be noted here for those unfamiliar with West Virginia
law that it is an offense "for any person who is under the influence
of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle on any highway of this
State. . ,,." So as it stands now we have modernized our statutes
dealing with the drinking driver.
The new law will operate in the following manner. When one
driving upon the public highways of this state is lawfully arrested
by (1) a member of the department of public safety of this state,
(2) any sheriff, a deputy sheriff of any county, or (3) any member
of a municipal police department under civil service, 4 upon reason-
able grounds that the driver is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, he will be requested to take either a blood, breath or urine
test within two hours from the time of the arrest. If the arresting
officer chooses the blood test, the driver may properly refuse to
take it, but, if he refuses to take either the breath or urine test
subsequently prescribed by the officer, after being told that his
failure to so submit will result in the loss of his privilege to drive
for six months, the driver will be in violation of the implied consent
law.
50 Payne v. Kinder, 147 W.Va. 352, 127 S.E.2d 726 (1946), upheld
prosecution of a driver who had been drinking beer for driving under the
influence of alcohol in face of statute providing beer to be a nonintoxicating
beverage; statute being merely for regulation of sale of beer and for collection
of taxes.
51 W. VA. CODE ch. 17c, art. 5, § 2A (Michie 1966).
52 Ch. 35, Acts of the West Virginia Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1968.
-5 W. VA. CODE ch. 17c, art. 5, § 2 (Michie 1966).
-4 Ch. 35, Acts of the West Virginia Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1968. Con-
stables are thus excluded.
19681
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If the driver refuses to take any test, none will be administered,
but the arresting officer will send to the commissioner of motor
vehicles a sworn statement that (1) he had reasonable grounds
to believe the driver to be under the influence, (2) the driver
was lawfully placed under arrest, (3) the driver refused to submit
to the test finally designated and (4) the driver was told that his
refusal to submit to the test finally designated would result in his
losing his privilege to drive for a six month period." Upon receipt
of this statement, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles will enter
an order suspending the operator's privilege to drive for six months,
and will forward a copy to the driver, by certified or registered
mail. After receipt of the order, the driver has ten days to enter
a written request for a hearing which shall be held within twenty
days of the commissioner's receipt of the request.56 At the hearing,
the petitioner may question only the validity of the four state-
ments in the officer's sworn report to the commissioner. If any of
these statements can be proven false, the commissioner will rescind
his earlier order of revocation of the privilege to drive. If the
driver fails to prove the falsity of any of the four statements, the
commissioner will enter an order affirming his earlier order of re-
vocation. If the commissioner after hearing the evidence affirms his
earlier order of revocation the petitioner may seek judical review
from the Circuit Court and then to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. The revocation of the privilege to drive shall be
stayed during the pending of the hearing and subsequent jucicial
review."
What if the driver agrees to submit to one of the tests prescribed
by the arresting officer? If the officer prescribes that a blood test
be given and the driver agrees, the driver will then be taken to a
physician, registered nurse, or trained medical technician at his
place of employment where the venapuncture must be performed
within two hours of the time of the arrest. 8 An unused, sterile
needle and a sterile vessel must be used for the test and a non-
alcoholic antiseptic must be used to clean the skin. If the driver
wishes, he may, at his own expense, have a blood test made by a
qualified person of his own choosing in addition to the officially






Goodwin: Implied Consent-Highway Safety
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968
LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS
administered one. 9 One arrested for driving under the influence,
although not required by the arresting officer, may demand a test
of his blood, breath or urine be administered.6" If the breath
or urine tests are chosen, the strict procedures provided for the
blood test will not be applicable.6 Analysis of the blood, breath or
urine must be conducted in accordance with the methods and
standards approved by the state department of health.62 A chemical
analysis of the blood or urine must be conducted by a qualified
laboratory or by the state police scientific laboratory.63
If one of the three tests are administered according to the proce-
dure set out in the article, the results will be made available to
the defendant upon request, and may be introduced in evidence
along with other competent evidence at a trial of any crime or
criminal action allegedly arising out of acts committed by the
defendant while driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.64 The following presumption will arise from
the result of the chemical analysis: (1) if .05 per cent or less of
alcohol in blood, prima facia evidence that driver was not under
influence; (2) if betwen .05 per cent and .10 per cent relevant
evidence of defendant's condition; (3) if .10 per cent or more, prima
facia evidence that the driver was under the influence. 65 One should
note that West Virginia has lowered its presumption level of in-
toxication from .15 per cent66 to .10 per cent thereby following
the trend mentioned earlier. Although the results of the analysis
show content to be .10 per cent or higher both parties to the suit
will be able to introduce other conpetent evidence, and the jury
will still have the final determination.
67
After examining West Virginia's new implied consent statute
which becomes effective May 9, 1968, it is evident that this








66 W. VA. CODE ch. 17c, art. 5, § 2A (Michie 1966).
67 Ch. 37, Acts of the West Virginia Legislature, Res. Sess. 1968; State
v. Garner, 147 W. Va. 293, 128 S.E.2d 185 (1964); Holley v. Purity Baking
Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 S.E.2d 729 (1946).
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problem created on our highways by the drinking driver. With
stiffer laws and enforcement procedures such as these, drivers should
be deterred from drinking excessively while driving. The effective-
ness of the new law should be shown in the near future by fewer
accidents, especially fatal ones.
William Douglass Goodwin
Open Housing
On February 7, 1968, an open housing law was passed to amend
article four, chapter eight of the Code of West Virginia. As amended
a new section thirty was added. It provides:
The council or similar governing body of any municipality
(however created, whether operating under a legislative charter,
home rule charter or general law only, and notwithstanding any
statutory or municipal charter provisions to the contrary) shall
have the power and authority, by ordinance, to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin
in the sale, purchase, lease or rental of housing accommodations
within the corporate limits of such municipality, and to impose
fines for the violation of the provisions of any such ordinance.'
As the focus in civil rights moves from the streets to the com-
promise table, many states have taken the initiative to enact fair
housing legislation.2 The primary purpose of this legislation is to
prevent discrimination by vendors and lessors against prospective
buyers or tenants because of race, color, or creed. The underlying
legal authority of all legislation of this type has been the liberal
construction by the United States Supreme Court of the commerce
clause, the Bill of Rights and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments. The civil rights movement in the United States was
unquestionably initiated when the Supreme Court in 1954 handed
down the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education.2
The anti-discrimination act as passed by the West Virginia Legisla-
ture is in the form of an enabling act. The act enables municipalities
Ch. 37, Acts of the West Virginia Legislature, Reg. Sess. 1968.
2 Note, Open Housing Meets My Old Kentucky Home, 56 Ky. L.J. 140,
187 (1967): "As of June 1967, some nineteen states and twenty-eight cities
had adopted anti-discrimination laws affecting some part of the private
housing market."
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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